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Abstract 
 Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating wage 
differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties of estimates 
of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates from about $0.5 million 
to about $21 million. We address most of the prominent econometric issues by applying panel 
data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and systematic selection of panel estimator 
in our research. Controlling for measurement error, endogeneity, individual heterogeneity, and 
state dependence yields both a reasonable average level and narrow range for the estimated value 
of a statistical life of about $5.5–$7.5 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Code J17, I12 
1. Introduction 
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of wage-
fatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics literature. The 
method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires 
agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory programs.1 More recently, VSL 
estimates have also provided the basis for assessing the mortality costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten 
and Kosec 2005, Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach, 
there is still concern over excessively large/small estimates and wide range of the estimates for 
VSL. Our research demonstrates how using the best available data and econometric practices pins 
down the estimated value of a statistical life.  
The apparent instability of the labor market VSL estimates has generated a series of 
prominent econometric controversies regarding the approach (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). As 
emphasized by Black and Kniesner (2003) and Ashenfelter (2006), there is an important 
measurement error issue. Does the fatality rate variable indicate the actual risk posed by the 
worker’s job? Because hedonic equilibrium reflects tangencies of firms’ market offer curves with 
a worker’s highest attainable expected utility locus, whether workers perceive the risk is an issue 
as well. Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) also note that there may be important omitted 
variables that bias VSL estimates.2 Chief among possible omitted variables for labor market 
studies may be measures of worker productivity and safety-related productivity, each of which 
has been of concern in the theoretical literature.3 Finally, labor market studies are based on 
fatality risk measures that may not be exogenous. Using data from outside the labor market, 
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004a, b) overcome the endogeneity problem using a possibly more 
exogenous event -- the state’s choice of the highway speed limit -- as their instrumental variable. 
There is no comparable labor market instrument, although there are previously unused 
econometric techniques available if one has micro panel data. 
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Almost all previous labor market studies have relied on cross-section wage regressions 
for which a fatality risk measure involving substantial measurement error is matched to the 
worker. Our research confronts the several econometric issues of critical interest: measurement 
error and endogeneity, omitted variables, heterogeneity, and state dependence. Using panel data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a new and more refined fatality risk measure, plus a 
variety of estimation methods we show how applying state-of-the-art econometric practices pins 
down the estimated value of a statistical life.  
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality risk 
variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous studies, but 
is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use one-year and three-year 
averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year fluctuations.4 Because the fatality rate 
data are available by year, workers in our panel who do not change jobs potentially can have a 
different fatality risk in different years. In contrast, the only previous panel-based labor market 
VSL study used the same occupational risk measure for all years, so that all possible variation in 
risk was restricted to job changers (Brown 1980). Our research also explores using adjacent year 
first differences as well as long differences, for which the influence of measurement error should 
be less pronounced. We also examine how instrumental variable estimates for each approach 
attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias. Finally, our dynamic first-difference 
estimates make it possible to include longer-run worker adaptations to changes in their job risk 
level that may occur if they are not perfectly informed about the risk initially. 
We infer the role of omitted variables through a variety of estimation approaches, most of 
which exploit the capabilities of our large panel data set. Fixed effect models sweep out the 
individual effects for both the adjacent year differences and the long differences. In each 
instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator, following Griliches and Hausman 
(1986). Our work also distinguishes job movers from job stayers. We find that most of the 
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variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive VSLs stems from people changing jobs 
across occupations or industries possibly endogenously rather than from variation in risk levels 
over time in a given job setting. 
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the estimated 
VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 75 percent from the implausibly large 
cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $18–$21 million. We demonstrate how careful econometric 
practice narrows the estimated value of a statistical life from about $0.5–$21 million (Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003) to only about $5.5–$7.5 million, which greatly clarifies the choice of the proper 
VSL to be used in policy evaluations. 
2. Canonical Econometric Framework 
 We begin with an econometrically familiar representation of the hedonic wage equation 
used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i = 1,…,N) in industry j (j = 1,…,J) 
and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the hedonic tradeoff between the wage and 
risk of fatality is  
  0 1ln ijkt i jkt ijkt t ijktw X uα α π β δ= + + + + ,    (1) 
where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate and πjkt is the industry and occupation 
specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the worker’s one-digit 
occupation (and industry in some specifications), region of residence, plus the usual 
demographic variables: worker education, age, race, marital status, and union status. Finally, tδ  
is a vector of time effects, and uijkt is an error term allowing an individual-specific effect plus 
conditional heteroskedasticity and within industry by occupation autocorrelation.5 
2.1 Measurement Error, Heterogeneity, and State Dependence 
 Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity through 
person-specific intercepts in (1) are the deviation from time-mean (within) estimator and the 
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time-difference (first-differences) estimator. The fixed effects include all person-specific time-
invariant differences in tastes and all aspects of productivity, which may be correlated with the 
regressors in X. The two estimators yield identical results when there are two time periods and 
when the number of periods converges towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2), 
estimates from the two different fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible non-
stationarity in wages, measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because 
wages from longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other 
contexts (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989), we adopt the preferred first-difference model 
as a baseline. 
 The first-difference model eliminates any time-invariant effect by estimating the changes 
over time in hedonic equilibrium 
   1ln ijkt ijk ijkt t ijktw X uα π β δΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ% ,    (2) 
where Δ  refers to the first-difference operator and tδ%  is a re-normalized vector of time dummies 
(Weiss and Lillard 1978). 
 The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative to the 
within model (Griliches and Hausman (1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a classical 
error, then the first-difference estimate of 1αˆ  may be attenuated relative to the within estimate. 
An advantage of the regression specification in (2), which considers intertemporal changes in 
hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can use so-called wider (2+ year) differences. 
If Δ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are mitigated in (2) relative to within-differences 
regression (Griliches and Hausman 1986). As discussed in the data section below, we 
additionally address the measurement error issue in the fatality rate by employing multi-year 
averages of fatalities. For completeness we also note how the first-difference estimates compare 
to the within estimates. 
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 Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have 
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To correct 
for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we estimate a double 
differenced version of (2) that is  
  2 2 2 21ln ijkt ijk ijkt t ijktw X uα π β δΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ%% ,    (3) 
where 2 1t t−Δ = Δ −Δ , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator, and tδ%%  is a re-
normalized vector of time dummies. We also estimate a dynamic version of (2) by adding γΔ ln 
wijkt−1 to the right-hand side and using the first-difference instrumental variables estimator 
recommended in Arellano (1989). Our dynamic estimator uses the two-period lagged level of the 
dependent variable as the identifying instrument for the one-period lagged difference in the 
dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable controls for additional heterogeneity and 
serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state dependence). We therefore 
compare the estimated short-run effect, 1αˆ , to the estimated long-run effect, 1ˆ ˆ/(1 )α γ− , and their 
associated VSLs. 
2.2 Comparison Estimators 
If [ | , ] 0ijk jk ijkE u Xπ = , which is the standard zero conditional mean assumption of least 
squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic equilibrium in (1) using pooled cross-
section time-series data is consistent. If the zero conditional mean assumption holds, which is 
unlikely to be the case, then the two basic estimators frequently employed with panel data, the 
between-groups estimator and the random-effects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient 
estimates. 
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’ time-
means of the variables 
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 1ln ijk jk ijk ijkw X uα π β δ= + + + ,     (4) 
with 
1
1ln ln
T
ijk ijkt
t
w w
T =
= ∑ and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of the 
between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in estimated 
coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating process. Because 
measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner 2003; Ashenfelter 2006), 
the between-groups estimator is likely to provide improved estimates of the wage-fatal risk 
tradeoff over OLS estimates of equation (1). 
 The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in (1) by specifying components 
of the overall error as ijkt i ijktu μ υ= + , where iμ  is person-specific and time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, and ijktυ  is an independently and identically distributed random error component. 
The random-effects estimator is a weighted average of the between-groups variation and the 
within-groups variation. 
 Consistency of the random-effects estimator requires [ | , ] 0i jkt ijktE Xμ π =  and 
[ | , ] 0ijkt jkt ijktE Xυ π = . The first condition implies that the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity is randomly distributed in the population. The implication is that selection into 
possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and tastes is 
purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least squares and 
between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random heterogeneity, the 
random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for person-specific 
autocorrelation in the wage process. 
 Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not random 
with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In the non-random 
selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section, between-groups, or random-
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effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the IV first-differences and double-differences 
estimators in equations (2) and (3) and the IV dynamic first-difference estimator can be 
consistent despite non-random job switching. 
2.3 Research Objective 
The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is 1αˆ , which 
is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting for the fact that 
fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is about 2000 hours, the 
estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is    
 1
ˆ ˆ( ) 2000 100,000wVSL wαπ
∂⎡ ⎤= = × × ×⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ .   (5) 
Although the VSL function in (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage distribution, 
most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in estimates of the VSL 
with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we follow the standard 
convention of focusing on VSL  in our estimates presented below. Our primary objective is to 
examine how following systematic econometric practices for panel data models reduces the 
estimated range and pins down VSL. 
3. Data and Sample Descriptions 
 The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and 
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households since 
1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off into new 
families. 
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3.1 PSID Sample 
 The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in the 
random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the oversample of 
the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino sub-sample. The male 
heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at some point in the previous 
calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or 
the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per 
hour, and (v) have no missing data on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation. 
Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For consistent 
spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves. We 
do not require individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we have an unbalanced 
panel where we take missing values as random events.6 Our sample filters yield 2,106 men and 
7,928 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present for all five waves (nine years); 
another 25 percent are present for at least four waves. 
 The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market equilibrium is 
the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the gross hourly wage rate. 
The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, 
or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried worker's pay by a fixed number of hours 
worked depending on the pay period. For example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate 
constructed for a salaried worker paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal 
consumption expenditure deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real 
wage rate to minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’ 
estimates. 
 The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a quadratic in 
age, dummy indicators for region of country (northeast, north central, and west with south the 
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omitted region), race (white = 1), union status (coverage = 1), marital status (married = 1), and 
one-digit occupation. Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures 
 We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit occupation group. 
We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown of 72 two-digit SIC code 
industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After constructing codes for two-digit 
industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then matched each worker to the relevant 
industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a worker fatality risk variable using proprietary 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 
1992–2002.7 
 The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related 
fatalities. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and medical examiner reports. 
In each case there is an examination of the records to determine that the fatality was in fact a job-
related incident.  
We focus on two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator. The 
first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell. The second 
measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey year (1992–1994 
for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The denominator for each measure 
used to construct the fatality risk is the number of employees for that industry-occupation group 
in survey year t. Both of our two measures of the fatality risk are time-varying because of 
changes in both the numerator and the denominator.8 
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates relative 
to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of random fluctuations 
in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise from many narrowly defined 
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job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the industry information than in the 
occupation information, so even our annual measure should have less measurement error than if 
the worker’s occupation were the basis for matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and 
Kniesner 2003). Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures. 
The sample mean fatality risk for the annual measure is 5.7/100,000. As expected, the variation 
in the annual measure exceeds that of the 3-year average. 
 Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wage-fatal risk 
tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or occupation the within 
or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the fatality risk measure to identify 
credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in aggregate fatal risk is of the so-called 
between-groups variety (across occupations or industries at a point in time) and not of the 
within-groups variety (within either occupations or industries over time). Although cross-group 
variation exceeds within-group variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate 
measures is sufficiently large (60–70 percent of the between variation) so that it may be feasible 
to identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we also address the 
issue that cross-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by endogenous job switching. 
4. Wage Equation Estimates 
 Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression model we 
use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union 
status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. Because of the substantial heterogeneity of 
jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of one-digit occupation dummies. The 
equations do not include industry dummy variables as well because doing so would introduce 
multicollinearity with respect to the fatality risk variable, which involves matching workers to 
fatality risk based on their industry and occupation. Indeed, including two-digit industry 
dummies in addition to occupation controls will remove all variation in the fatality risk variable. 
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Reported standard errors are clustered by industry and occupation and are also robust to the 
relevant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note that our first-difference regressions 
automatically net out the influence of industry and other job characteristics that do not change 
over time, and the double-difference regressions net out additional trending factors. 
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data 
 The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The results 
are our basic attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and possibly trended 
regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down a column and across a 
row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are reasonable from both an 
econometric and economic perspective and provide the comparison point for our core research 
issue, which is how badly VSL can be mis-represented if certain basic econometric issues are 
mis-handled. 
 The VSL implied by the coefficient for the annual fatality rate in Table 3 using the sample 
mean wage of $21 is $6.1 million. We emphasize that a novel aspect of our research is that it 
helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If measurement error in fatality risk 
is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and should be reduced by letting the fatality rate 
encompass a wider interval. Compared to VSL from the more typical annual risk measure, the 
estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 20 percent larger when fatality risk is a three-year average. 
The last two columns of Table 3 report the results for widest possible differences 
( 2001 1993ln lnw w− ) as well as difference-in-differences from equation (3), which should remove 
possible spurious estimated effects from variables that are not difference stationary. The main 
message from Table 3 is that correcting for measurement error enlarges estimated VSL, and that 
even for the relatively basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not large, 
$5.8–$7.6 million.  
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 An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity of the 
fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make to change jobs 
(Solon 1986, 1989). Some changes in fatality risk will occur because of within industry-
occupation cell changes and others will occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells. 
We examine the practical importance for panel based estimation in Table 4, where we stratify the 
data by whether Δπ is due to within or between cell changes, including immediately before and 
after a worker changes cell. The main econometric contribution to compensating differentials for 
fatality risk comes from workers who generate differences in risk over time by switching 
industry-occupation cells. The difference in estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that 
tπσ is 2–3 times larger for switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to 
reveal much of a compensating differential. More important, because so much of the variation 
producing the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the variation for 
switchers may be related to wages, it is important to treat Δπ  as endogenous. 
 The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity and 
instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table 5 control 
for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. We limit the focus to the annual fatality 
rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as instruments. The main result 
is a very narrow range of estimated VSL, $5.6–$5.7 million when we instrument the annual 
change in fatality risk. 
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference regressions. 
The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the long-run (steady state) 
estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences estimator focuses on changes in 
wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by which the changes will become 
reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the risk level will affect the tangencies of 
the constant expected utility loci with the market offer curve. To the extent that the updating of 
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risk beliefs occurs gradually over time, which is not unreasonable because even release of the 
government risk data is not contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of 
changes in job risk to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a 
lagged influence (state dependence). As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL 
after the estimated three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the short-
run estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $7–8 million 
versus $10–11 million. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not wide when panel data are used 
with state-of-the-art estimators appropriate for the issues of endogeneity, measurement error, 
latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence. 
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators 
 Table 7 presents the comparison models, which flesh out the most salient econometric 
issues when compared to the focal results from Tables 3–6 just presented. 
 One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for VSL 
when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the cross-section 
estimators in columns 1 and 2 produce large implied VSLs, which also have a much numerically 
larger range than the panel estimates, $16–22 million. 
 In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects 
estimator. Recall that the random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, which 
is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly common in labor-market 
research to reject the assumption of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and 
observed covariates; we find a similar rejection here. This implies that the simple fixed effects 
within estimator in the last column is preferred over the simple random effects estimator, with an 
estimated VSL of about $5.5 million. Allowing for the possibility of unobserved productivity and 
preferences for risk, even if it is improperly assumed to be randomly distributed in the 
population, reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent relative to a model that ignores latent 
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heterogeneity (the pooled least squares estimates). The difference in estimated VSL with versus 
without latent individual heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
in Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a 
potentially substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the influence of 
individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable person-specific differences in 
safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more powerful influence than unobservable 
productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize to have the 
opposite effect. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been 
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence in 
affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting influence 
of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions of different 
direction. The first-difference estimation results reported here use more refined fatality risk 
measures than employed in earlier studies, making it possible to control for measurement errors 
and workplace safety endogeneity when examining the wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison 
of the various first-difference results with various cross-section estimates implies that controlling 
for latent worker-specific heterogeneity reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent and 
narrows greatly the VSL range to about $5.5–$7.5 million.  
 The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern that 
underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The range for 
VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from $0.5 million to $21 million. Previous 
studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded extremely high VSL 
estimates around $20 million. Earlier research did not control for the host of econometric 
problems we address here. The econometrically most general first-difference estimates we report 
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range from $5.5 million to $7.5 million. Our research has resolved the econometric issues giving 
rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates. The disparate results 
in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted unobservable effects, among other 
repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to address these underlying econometric 
issues may have unduly muddled the policy debate over the use of VSL estimates in benefit 
calculations for government policies. 
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Endnotes
 
1.  See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 
2003). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
2. The Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) examination of VSL levels implied by driving 
behavior provides an ingenious solution to the omitted variables and risk endogeneity 
issue. They use state-level decisions about highway speed limits as their instrument. 
However, both the underlying driving time saved by higher speed limits and the state’s 
decision to pass the legislation could also be influenced by fuel economy concerns. 
Driver decisions and the probability that a state adopts a particular speed limit may 
depend on more than the safety dimension of the choice. 
3. Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize that unobserved worker productivity 
biases VSL estimates downwards. Viscusi and Hersch (2001) examine safety-related 
productivity, but do not offer any directional hypothesis regarding the induced bias. 
Shogren and Stamland (2002) theorize that unobservable worker skill in promoting safety 
leads VSL estimates to be too high, but their result stems from analysis of infra-marginal 
workers who will not be captured in market evidence. 
4.  The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for 
different periods of time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also 
used the 720 cell measure but not the multi-year averages. 
5.  The econometric structure in (1) is different than Brown’s (1980) panel data model 
where the job risk variable was the same in all years and was given by the 1967 Society 
of Actuaries data, which provided information on overall mortality risks for people in 37 
relatively high risk occupational groups and produced a VSL of only about $1.9 million. 
Moreover, the time variation in risk in his model arose from changes in occupation over 
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time. In contrast, our research uses a highly refined fatality risk measure for 720 industry-
occupation cells for which there is variation across time as well as variation that arises as 
workers change either their occupation or industry. Finally, we adopt a parametric 
specification of the regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for 
comparison purposes with the existing literature. An important emerging line of research 
is how more econometrically free-form representations of hedonic labor markets 
facilitates identification of  underlying fundamentals, which would further generalize 
estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004). 
6.  Ziliak and Kniesner 1999 show that if nonrandom attrition is present our differenced 
model in (2) should sweep it out along with the other time-invariant factors. 
7.  The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi 
(2004). 
8.  We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Current Population Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed 
Industry and Occupation for 1993–2001.  
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Table 1.  Selected Summary Statistics 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Real Hourly Wage 21.058 13.352 
Log Real Hourly Wage 2.881 0.570 
Age 40.895 8.450 
Marital Status (1=Married) 0.820 0.384 
Race (1=White) 0.764 0.425 
Union (1=member) 0.230 0.421 
Years of Schooling 13.585 2.216 
Live in Northeast 0.177 0.382 
Live in Northcentral 0.288 0.453 
Live in South 0.372 0.483 
Live in West 0.163 0.370 
   
One-Digit Industry Groups:   
Mining 0.008 0.087 
Construction 0.106 0.308 
Manufacturing 0.259 0.438 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.109 0.311 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.130 0.337 
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.045 0.208 
Business and Repair Services 0.066 0.248 
Personal Services 0.009 0.097 
Entertainment and Professional Services 0.169 0.375 
Public Administration 0.098 0.297 
   
One-Digit Occupation Groups:   
Executive and Managerial 0.187 0.390 
Professional 0.162 0.368 
Technicians 0.058 0.234 
Sales 0.032 0.177 
Administrative Support 0.066 0.248 
Services 0.086 0.280 
Precision Production Crafts 0.207 0.405 
Machine Operators 0.078 0.268 
Transportation 0.080 0.272 
Handlers and Labors 0.045 0.208 
   
Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 5.681 8.849 
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 5.543 8.319 
   
Number of Men = 2,106   
Number of Person Years = 7,928     
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Table 2:  Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by Occupation Fatality Rates 
    
 
Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
Between Group 
Standard 
Deviation 
Within 
Group 
Standard 
Deviation 
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.849 7.609 5.120 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.319 7.509 4.413 
    
    
Never Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.695 9.039 2.382 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.460 9.094 1.491 
    
Ever Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.914 6.708 5.913 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.258 6.491 5.179 
    
Only When Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 9.002 7.368 5.532 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 8.150 6.911 4.657 
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Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Original Static 
First Difference 
Estimates 
First-Difference 
Estimator for 
2001minus1993  
Difference in 
Differences 
Estimator 
       
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.4425 1.6646 1.5553 
  (0.4175) (1.3584) (0.5091) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  6.1 7.0 6.6  
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.7531 1.3834 1.7979 
  (0.5276) (1.4344) (0.6142) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  7.4 5.8 7.6 
     
Number of Observations   5242 1255 
  
3373 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of 
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To 
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status 
  Static First-Difference 
First-Difference Estimator 
for 2001 minus 1993  
Never Change Industry-Occupation   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 0.3306 -0.1188 
 (1.2132) (2.8783) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 1.4 −0.5 
  
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 -0.5653 2.1041 
 (2.2522) (3.9626) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) −2.4 8.9 
   
Number of Person-Years 1493 330 
Ever Change Industry-Occupation   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.5483 1.9423 
 (0.4473) (1.4353) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 6.5 8.2 
   
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.8660 1.4322 
 (0.5352) (1.5141) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.9 6.0 
   
Number of Person-Years 3749 925 
Only When Change Industry-Occupation  
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.7252 1.7662 
 (0.4996) (1.4580) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.3 7.4 
   
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 2.0045 1.3121 
 (0.5604) (1.5303) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 8.4 5.5 
   
Number of Person-Years 1033 745 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series cross-
section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-
occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for 
region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using 
equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, t−1 and t−3  
Fatality as Instruments 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, Lag Differenced 
Fatality as Instrument 
   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.3377 1.3417 
 (0.6676) (0.6677) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 5.6 5.7 
   
   
First Stage Results   
   
t−1 fatality rate 0.6528  
 (0.0114)  
   
t−3 fatality rate −0.6512  
 (0.0113)  
   
(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)  0.6520 
  (0.0103) 
   
R2 0.54 0.54 
   
   
Number of Observations 5242 5242 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years 
of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year 
effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted 
instruments. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 
1,000. 
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Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
    
 Dynamic First-Difference Estimates   
 with lag wage instrumented   
      
      
 
Short-Run 
Effect Long-Run Effect    
      
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.7583  2.4825     
 (0.5390) [0.0024]    
      
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.4 10.5    
      
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.8154  2.5623     
 (0.6629) [0.0088]    
      
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.6  10.8    
      
Number of Observations 3373    
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that the long-run effect is zero 
are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation 
autocorrelation. Models control for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union 
status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. One and two year lags of the independent variables, except for the 
fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in 
the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 7.  Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Pooled Cross 
Section Time 
Series Estimator 
Between-Group 
Estimator 
Random-Effects 
Estimator 
Fixed-Effects 
Estimator 
     
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 3.8702  5.2443  1.7401  1.2498  
 (0.9972) (1.5944) (0.5185) (0.5382) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 16.3 22.1 7.3 5.3 
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 4.3338  5.0506  2.0445  1.3352  
 (1.0316) (1.5811) (0.6074) (0.6452) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 18.3 21.3 8.6 5.6 
     
Number of Observations 7928 2106 7928 7737 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series cross-section 
estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation 
autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital 
status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the 
coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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